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We estimate the impact of local mining activity on the business constraints experienced by 
22,150 firms across eight resource-rich countries. We find that with the presence of active 
mines, the business environment in the immediate vicinity (<20 km) of a firm deteriorates but 
business constraints of more distant firms relax. The negative local impact of mining is 
concentrated among firms in tradeable sectors whose access to inputs and infrastructure 
becomes more constrained. This deterioration of the local business environment adversely 
affects firm growth and is in line with a natural resource curse at the sub-national level.  
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1.  Introduction 
The last two decades have witnessed an extraordinary expansion in global mining activity. A 
surge in commodity demand from industrializing countries pushed up the price of metals, 
minerals and oil. This in turn led to substantial new mining investment, an increasing share of 
which was concentrated in emerging markets (Humphreys, 2010). This geographical shift 
reflects the fact that many American and European mineral deposits have by now been depleted 
and that the long-distance transport of minerals by sea has become less costly. As a result, the 
world’s largest mines can nowadays be found in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
The mining boom has also reinvigorated the debate about the impact of mining on economic 
activity and welfare. Some regard mines simply as stand-alone enclaves without any notable 
local impact (Hirschman, 1958). Others point to the potentially negative consequences of 
natural resource dependence such as real exchange rate appreciation, economic volatility, 
deindustrialization and corruption (see van der Ploeg (2011) for a comprehensive survey). 
Mines may also pollute and threaten the livelihoods of local food producers and they often 
require vast amounts of water, electricity, labor and infrastructure, for which they may compete 
with local manufacturers. Yet others stress the potential for positive spillovers to firms and 
households as mining operators may buy local inputs and hire local employees.1 Local wealth 
also increases if governments use taxable mining profits to invest in regional infrastructure or 
to make transfers to the local population. 
Our paper informs this debate by estimating the impact of active mines on nearby firms 
across eight countries with large manufacturing and mining sectors: Brazil, Chile, China, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Russia and Ukraine. Our detailed data allow us to get around 
the endogeneity issues that plague country-level studies as well as the limitations to external 
validity of well-identified country-specific papers. Our empirical analysis is motivated by the 
“Dutch disease” model of Corden and Neary (1982) which sets out how a resource boom drives 
up wage costs for firms in the traded (manufacturing) sector as they compete for labor with 
firms in the resource and non-traded sectors. We hypothesize that mining companies and 
manufacturing firms also compete for other inelastically supplied inputs and public goods—
such as transport infrastructure and electricity—and that this hurts tradeable-sector firms, which 
are price takers on world markets, in particular. 
                                                             
1 For example, Wright and Czelusta (2007) argue that “linkages and complementarities to the resource sector were 
vital in the broader story of American economic success”. 
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We test this hypothesis by combining two main data sets. First, we use detailed data on 
22,150 firms from the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
Survey (BEEPS) and the World Bank Enterprise Survey. These data contain the responses of 
firm managers to questions on the severity of various obstacles to the operation and growth of 
their business, including access to transport infrastructure and electricity, the availability of 
educated workers, the cost of land, access to finance, and crime and corruption. A small but 
burgeoning literature has started to use survey data like these to gauge whether and how 
institutional quality and access to public goods affects firm performance.2 
Second, we use the proprietary SNL Metals & Mining data set, which contains 
comprehensive information on the geographical location, operating status and production data 
for individual mines. We identify the latitude and longitude of 3,793 mines producing 31 
different metals and minerals in our country sample. Depending on the year, we observe the 
operating status of between 1,526 and 2,107 mines. 
Merging these firm and mine data allows us to paint a precise and time-varying picture of 
the mines that open, operate and close around each firm. Since local mining activity is plausibly 
exogenous to the performance of individual firms—as it largely depends on local geology and 
world mineral prices—we can identify the impact of mining on local business constraints and 
firm performance. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to estimate this impact 
of mining activity on firm performance across a variety of countries. 
Two core results emerge from our analysis, both consistent with a sub-national version of 
the seminal Corden and Neary (1982) model. First, in line with a “resource-movement effect”, 
we uncover heterogeneous mining impacts in the immediate vicinity (≤ 20 kilometers) of active 
mines that depend on whether a firm produces tradeable or non-tradeable goods. Only producers 
of tradeables that are close to active mines report tighter business constraints (as compared with 
similar firms that are not close to mines). These firms are especially hampered in their ability 
to access transport infrastructure, educated workers and finance. Importantly, these mining-
induced business constraints hurt firm performance in terms of employment, asset size and 
sales. Our results indicate that moving a producer of tradeables from a region without mines to 
a region with average mining intensity would reduce sales by 10 percent on average. In sharp 
                                                             
2 See, for instance, Commander and Svejnar (2011) and Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2013). Appendix B 
contains the questions we use in this paper and www.enterprisesurveys.org provides additional background 
information. The surveys also provide a rich array of firm covariates, such as their industry, age, sales, 
employment, and ownership structure. 
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contrast, up- or downstream firms in the natural resource sector itself and firms in the 
construction and non-traded sector actually benefit from local mining activity. 
Second, in line with a sub-national “spending effect” we find that current mining activity 
improves the provision of public goods in a distance band of between 20 and 150 km around 
firms. This indicates that while mines can cause infrastructure bottlenecks in their immediate 
vicinity and crowd out other firms, they may improve the business environment on a wider 
geographical scale. 
In robustness tests we vary the distance bands around firms; exclude young firms which 
may self-select into locations close to mines; exclude firms that have plants in multiple 
locations; examine coal mines separately; control for giant oil and gas fields; analyze panel data 
for a sub-set of firms; and measure mining activity using satellite imagery of night-time light 
intensity. None of this affects our main results. 
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the economic impact of natural resource 
abundance. Early contributions point to a negative cross-country correlation between resource 
exports and long-term economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997 and Auty, 2001). Various 
mechanisms have been proposed for why resource-rich countries appear unable to convert 
natural resources into productive assets. These include an appreciation of the real exchange rate 
which turns non-resource exports uncompetitive (the aforementioned Dutch disease); 
worsening institutions and governance (Besley and Persson, 2010; Dell, 2010); rent seeking 
(Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006; Beck and Laeven, 2006) and increased conflict (Collier 
and Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004). The cross-country evidence 
remains mixed—reflecting thorny endogeneity issues—and the very existence of a resource 
curse continues to be heavily debated (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010; James, 2015). 
To strengthen identification, recent papers exploit micro data to estimate the impact of 
natural resource discoveries on local living standards.3 Aragón and Rud (2013) show how the 
Yanacocha gold mine in Peru improved incomes and consumption of nearby households. Their 
findings indicate that mining can have positive local equilibrium effects if backward linkages 
are strong enough.4 Loayza, Mier y Teran and Rigolini (2013) and Lippert (2014) also 
                                                             
3 See Cust and Poelhekke (2015) for a survey. Others estimate impacts on health and behavioral outcomes such as 
female empowerment and infant morbidity (Tolonen, 2015) and risky sexual behavior (Wilson, 2012). Sub-
national data have also been used to reassess claims based on cross-country data, such as that natural resources 
cause armed conflict and violence (Dube and Vargas, 2013; Arezki, Bhattacharyya and Mamo, 2015; Berman, 
Couttenier, Rohner and Thoenig, 2015). 
4 Backward linkages exist if mines purchase local inputs like food, transportation services and raw materials. 
Forward linkages include the downstream processing of mineral ores such as smelting and refining. 
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document positive impacts on living standards for Peru and Zambia, respectively. For the case 
of Ghana, Fafchamps, Koelle and Shilpi (2016) find that gold mining has led to agglomeration 
effects that benefit non-farm activities.5 Consistent with these country studies, Von der Goltz 
and Barnwall (2014) show for a sample of developing countries that while mining boosts local 
wealth, it often comes at the cost of pollution and negative health impacts. 
We contribute to this nascent literature in two ways. First, we shift the focus from 
households to firms in order to gain insights into the mechanisms through which mining affects 
local economic activity (and ultimately household incomes).6 We not only observe firm-level 
outcomes (such as sales and employment) but also the mechanisms through which mining 
activity hampers some sectors but benefits others. Second, using harmonized micro data from 
a diverse set of countries with large mining and manufacturing sectors adds to the internal as 
well as external validity of our results. 
Our paper also relates to a small parallel literature on local oil and gas booms in the United 
States. Michaels (2011) and Allcott and Keniston (2014) show that historical hydrocarbon 
booms benefited county-level economic growth through positive agglomeration effects, 
backward and forward linkages, and lower transport costs.7 In contrast, Jacobson and Parker 
(2014) find that the US oil and gas boom of the 1970s led to negative long-term income effects. 
They suggest that contrary to booms in the more distant past (as studied by Michaels, 2011) the 
persistent negative effects of the 1970s boom offset any long-term positive agglomeration 
effects. We assess whether our results are sensitive to the presence of oil and gas production by 
extending our regressions with the number of oil and gas fields (if any) around each firm. 
We also contribute to the literature on the relationship between the business environment 
and firm performance. This literature has moved from using country-level proxies for the 
business environment (Kaufmann, 2002) to firm-level, survey-based indicators of business 
constraints. While various papers find negative correlations between such indicators and firm 
                                                             
5 Aragón and Rud (2015) show the flipside of Ghanaian gold mining: increased pollution, lower agricultural 
productivity and more child malnutrition and respiratory diseases. 
6 Glaeser, Kerr and Kerr (2015) show how proximity to mining deposits led US cities to specialize in scaleable 
activities, such as steel production, at the cost of fewer start-ups. This negative impact on local entrepreneurship 
can become entrenched if entrepreneurial skills and attitudes are transmitted across generations (Chinitz, 1961). 
7 Caselli and Michaels (2013) show that revenue windfalls from Brazilian offshore oil wells (where backward and 
forward linkages are less likely) led to more municipal spending but not to improved living standards. Brollo, 
Nannicini, Perotti and Tabellini (2013) show that this may reflect an increase in windfall-induced corruption and 
a decline in the quality of local politicians. Likewise, Asher and Novosad (2016) show how mining booms in India 
result in the election of criminal politicians. 
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performance, endogeneity concerns linger.8 Commander and Svejnar (2011) link firm 
performance in 26 transition countries to firms’ own assessments of various aspects of the 
business environment. They conclude that once country fixed effects are included, firms’ 
perceptions of business constraints add little explanatory power. Our contribution is to use 
exogenous shocks that stem from the opening of large-scale mines to help mitigate the 
endogeneity concerns that continue to plague this literature. 
Lastly, a related literature investigates the negative externalities (congestion) and positive 
externalities (agglomeration) of geographically concentrated economic activity.9 Congestion 
occurs when firms compete for a limited supply of infrastructure or other public goods.10 
Agglomeration effects emerge when spatially proximate firms benefit from deeper local labor 
markets, the better availability of services and intermediate goods, and knowledge spillovers 
(Marshall, 1920). In line with agglomeration benefits, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti 
(2010) show that US firms close to new large plants experience positive productivity spillovers. 
We assess whether newly opened mines mainly lead to positive agglomeration or negative 
congestion effects for nearby firms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple theoretical model and derives 
our main hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 then describe our data and empirical strategy, after which 
Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Theory and hypotheses 
To build intuition on how a mining boom affects both local and more distant firms, we adapt a 
multiregional de-industrialization model (Allcott and Keniston, 2014). This theoretical 
framework is closely related to earlier Dutch disease models (Corden and Neary, 1982; Van 
Wijnbergen, 1984). The distinctive feature of our model is that there are multiple regions across 
                                                             
8 E.g. Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2002); Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovich (2005); Dollar, 
Hallward-Driemeier and Mengistae (2006) and Hallward-Driemeier, Wallstein and Xu (2006). Some papers use 
industry or city averages of business constraints as regressors or instruments to reduce endogeneity concerns. 
9 See Combes and Gobillon (2015) for a survey of the agglomeration literature. 
10 A recent literature investigates the spatial impact of infrastructure on economic activity. Donaldson (2014) 
shows how new railways in colonial India integrated regions and boosted welfare gains from trade. In a similar 
vein, Bonfatti and Poelhekke (2015) show how purpose-built mining infrastructure across Africa determined long-
term trading patterns between countries. In China, the construction of trunk roads and railways reinforced the 
concentration of economic activity and increased economic output (Faber, 2014 and Banerjee, Duflo and Qian, 
2012). In the United States, Chandra and Thompson (2000) and Michaels (2008) exploit the construction of 
interstates to document agglomeration effects. 
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which labor is (imperfectly) mobile and that redistribution of natural resource rents may take 
place between regions.11 
We model each region as a small open economy where each consumer supplies one unit of 
labor. Consumers work in one of three sectors: the manufacturing sector m , which produces 
goods that are tradeable internationally and across regions; services n , which are non-tradeable 
across regions; and the tradeable natural resource sector r . The prices of both manufacturing 
goods mp  and minerals rp  are set on world markets and therefore exogenous. Only the price 
of non-traded services nip  is endogenous and varies by region i. Each sector s  produces 
 ,si si s si siX A F l h  where siA  is productivity. siA  has a local component due to a sector’s 
reliance on region-specific inputs such as agglomeration economies or natural resource 
deposits. sF  is a production function common to sector s  with  0 0sF  ,   0sF    and
  0sF    , and sil  is labor employed by sector s  in region i . 
Employment is perfectly substitutable across sectors and is mobile between regions such 
that total labor supply iL  is an increasing function of both wages and transfers received by 
workers:  i i iL L w b  . With full employment we have: 
    mi ri ni i il l l L w b      (1) 
Per capita transfers b  are an increasing function of national resource rents 
  r ri i ri
i
R p X wl  but ultimately depend on the country’s welfare function and the 
exogenous weights attached to individuals in the extracting region. For example, if local 
consumers own the mining land (which resembles the institutional setting in the United States) 
then transfers in the form of royalty payments can be substantial. Conversely, if the state owns 
the mining rights (as is the case in most other countries) then fewer mining rents are 
redistributed to the producing region and rents are instead spread across regions. 
Labor input l can also be interpreted as being used in combination with public good inputs, 
such as infrastructure, which are used in a fixed proportion to labor. We assume that such public 
goods are not mobile across regions, exogenously provided by a higher layer of government, 
and increasing in national natural resource rents R. A higher demand for l then translates into a 
higher demand for public goods as well. Crucially, the supply of such goods does not 
                                                             
11 We do not model firm heterogeneity or firm entry or exit as we cannot measure firm-level productivity. 
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endogenously adjust to higher shadow prices for their use. For example, increased congestion 
on rail and roads will drive up delays and transportation costs, but it is up to the (national) 
government to invest more in these public goods. 
We assume that all minerals are directly or indirectly exported.12 Aggregate income in 
region i  then equals consumption of manufacturing goods and services from which consumers 
with Cobb-Douglas preferences derive utility U : 
   ii i m mi ni niw b p C p CL     (2) 
where miC  includes imports from other regions and countries. Demand is given by: 
  ni ni i i ip C L w b    (3) 
   1m mi i i ip C L w b     (4) 
The term ib  is the spending effect in the terminology of Corden and Neary (1982). If these 
transfers are zero, then an increase in the profitability of the natural resource sector will raise 
wages and non-traded prices proportionally. Transfers may be such that a natural resource boom 
in region i  can introduce a spending effect in region i , for example in the state or province to 
which the region belongs. 
The services and traded manufacturing goods market equilibria follow as: 
  ni ni ni n niC X A F l    (5) 
  mi mi mi mi m mi miC X IM A F l IM      (6) 
where mIM  are net imports of manufactured goods. Finally, perfect sectoral labor mobility 
equalizes wages across sectors to their marginal product: 
        i m mi m mi r ri r ri ni ni n niw p A F l p A F l p A F l       (7) 
We model a local resource boom as an exogenous shock to the natural resource sector in region 
i  such that this sector becomes more productive. This can either be achieved through a rise in
                                                             
12 Downstream sectors may use minerals as inputs and subsequently export all downstream products. 
8 
rp , the world price of minerals, or through a rise in riA , which can be thought of as an 
improvement in extraction technology or the discovery of new deposits in region i .13 In both 
cases local profits increase, which also increases transfers ib . 
The impact of the local resource boom r rip A  will be fourfold. First, the demand for labor 
and public goods in the mineral sector rises and wages increase (equation 7). However, to the 
extent that labor supply iL  is not perfectly inelastic, immigration from other regions will 
dampen this increase in wages.14 For perfectly elastic supply, the increase in labor demand in 
the mineral sector is completely met by supply from other regions.15 Moreover, to the extent 
that supply chains are local, firms with strong upstream or downstream linkages to mines may 
benefit from an increased demand for intermediate inputs (Moretti, 2010). 
Second, the boom in r rip A  raises services prices nip  and induces a real appreciation in 
region i . The production of non-traded services increases too. Higher wages (if labor demand 
is not fully met through immigration) are passed on to higher non-traded prices through a rise 
in local aggregate demand. Moreover, a rise in r rip A  raises mineral rents and thereby regional 
transfers ib . This also raises local aggregate demand and further drives up prices nip  and 
services production niX .
16 
                                                             
13 New discoveries are assumed to be exogenous as exploration is spatially homogeneous within country-years in 
the sense that it is uncorrelated with pre-existing economic activity and other local characteristics. 
14 Since labor and public goods are used in fixed proportions, immigration will not dampen the wage increase 
unless more public goods are supplied as well. These may be financed by natural resource rents.  
15 An increase in 
r r
p A  raises the marginal product of labor in the resource sector and thus wages in (7). It also 
decreases employment in the other two sectors (rewrite (7) for sector m (an equivalent for n) as 
 1 r ri
mi m r ri
m mi
p A
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 . Taking the derivative to r rip A  and using the fact that F is concave, 
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Third, if wages increase, profitability in the manufacturing sector declines because the 
traded sector is a price taker on world markets. From the marginal product of labor in the 
manufacturing sector it follows that ril  and riX  decrease, which is the resource-movement 
effect in Corden and Neary (1982). Manufacturing consequently contracts as firms compete 
with establishments in non-resource regions that did not suffer the same increase in input costs 
(Moretti, 2011). 
Fourth, to the extent that labor is mobile between regions and rents are redistributed across 
regions, we should expect spillover effects. The immigration of labor into the boom region 
results in excess labor demand in origin regions and possibly a shrinking of services and 
manufacturing sectors in these regions. Unless labor is highly mobile, we expect this effect to 
attenuate with distance. 
The increase in aggregate demand in the producing region spills over into higher demand 
for manufactured goods, which have to be supplied through imports from other regions or 
countries. In the former case, the demand for manufacturing goods in non-booming regions will 
increase. This effect is particularly strong if no redistribution of rents takes place and local 
income increases by the full amount of rents. In our sample of countries, it is more likely that 
the increase in national mineral rents spreads to non-booming regions through transfers. These 
transfers thus introduce a spending effect in non-booming regions as well. From the perspective 
of the traded sector, the positive trade and spending effects are likely to be attenuated less by 
distance than the wage effect (which reflects regional competition for relatively immobile 
labor). 
In all, this theoretical discussion suggests two main testable hypotheses with regard to the 
impact of mining on the business constraints faced by nearby firms: 
1. Negative resource-movement effects in the vicinity of mines are associated with a 
deterioration of the business environment experienced by local firms. At a greater distance 
from mines, these negative effects are (more than) compensated by positive spending effects 
as the provision of public goods expands and the business environment improves. 
2. In line with local resource-movement effects in the immediate vicinity of mines, firms in 
tradeable sectors experience tighter business constraints (in terms of access to labor and 
                                                             
0
i r ri
L p A   , and 0
ri r ri
l p A    yields that an increase in 
r ri
p A raises both non-traded labor input and 
production. This results from an increase in wages and thus population 
i
L  and through increased demand due to 
the transfer of rents. Finally, non-traded prices increase. 
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public goods such as infrastructure and institutions) than firms in non-tradeable sectors or 
in the natural resource sector. Positive spending effects benefit firms across all sectors. 
 
3.  Data 
For our purposes we need data on the business constraints experienced by individual firms as 
well as detailed information on the presence of mines in the vicinity of each firm. We therefore 
merge our firm-level survey data from eight emerging markets—Brazil, Chile, China, 
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Mongolia, Russia and Ukraine—with the geographical coordinates of the 
near universe of minerals (including coal) and metal mines in these countries. All of these 
countries are geographically large, have a substantial mining sector and participated in one or 
more business environment surveys.17 
 
3.1. Mining data 
We download data from the leading provider of mining information, SNL’s Metal & Mining 
(formerly Raw Materials Group). The data set contains for each mine annual information on 
the production levels for each mineral as well as the GPS coordinates of its centre point. We 
also know the mine’s operation status at each point in time. This allows us to distinguish 
between active (operating) and inactive mines. This status is typically driven by exogenous 
world prices: when prices rise, more mines (re-)open. We assemble this information for the 
3,794 mines scattered across the eight countries. For a subset of active mines we also know ore 
production and reserves.18 Production is measured in millions of tons (metric megaton, Mt) of 
minerals mined per annum while reserves refer to the Mt of probable and proven ore in the 
ground.19 While a measure of ore produced (which includes both rocks and minerals) is a better 
gauge of how many inputs the mine requires, we also experiment with the weight in mineral 
                                                             
17 The value of natural resource extraction at world prices as a share of GDP in 2008—not taking into account 
production costs—was 8 percent in Brazil; 25 percent in Chile; 15 percent in China; 56 percent in Kazakhstan; 12 
percent in Mexico; 35 percent in Mongolia; 40 percent in Russia; and 17 percent in Ukraine (source: World Bank, 
Adjusted Net Savings Data). 
18 Mines typically produce several minerals. Appendix Table A3 provides a frequency table of the minerals in our 
data set. All minerals and metals are point-source resources: unlike diffuse natural resources such as coffee and 
tobacco, they are produced in geographically concentrated locations. 
19 SNL’s Metal & Mining defines ore reserves as the sum of probable and proven reserves, where “an ore reserve 
is defined as the economically mineable part of a measured or indicated mineral resource. It includes diluting 
materials and allowances for losses, which may occur when the material is mined. Appropriate assessments, which 
may include feasibility studies, have been carried out, and include consideration of and modification by 
realistically assumed mining, metallurgical, economic, marketing, legal, environmental, social and governmental 
factors. These assessments demonstrate that, at the time of reporting, extraction could reasonably be justified”. 
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content being produced. Lastly, we calculate for each mine the total production value by 
multiplying the production of each metal or ore with its current world price. 
We exclude data on the production of oil and gas as hydrocarbon production typically has 
a different structure in terms of environmental, social and economic impacts (World Bank, 
2002). For instance, oil and gas tend to occur in larger concentrations of wealth than metals and 
other minerals and this might lead to larger spending effects. Hydrocarbon production is also 
more capital intensive and may therefore affect labor demand to a lesser extent. We return to 
the issue of hydrocarbon production in Section 5.5. 
 
3.2. Firm data 
To measure firms’ business constraints we use various rounds of the EBRD-World Bank 
Business Environment and Performance Survey (BEEPS) and the equivalent World Bank 
Enterprise Surveys. Face-to-face interviews were held with 22,150 firms in 2,144 locations 
across our country sample to measure to what extent particular aspects of the business 
environment hold back firm performance. The surveys were administered on the basis of a 
common design and implementation guidelines. 
Firms were selected using random sampling with three stratification levels to ensure 
representativeness across industry, firm size and region. The sample includes firms from all 
main industries (both manufacturing and services) and this allows us to use industry fixed 
effects in our regression framework. While mines are not part of the surveys, upstream and 
downstream natural resource firms are included. The first four columns of Appendix Table A4 
summarize the number of observations by year and country (all regressions include country-
year fixed effects). We have data for the fiscal years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011. 
As part of the survey, owners or top managers evaluated aspects of the local business 
environment and public infrastructure in terms of how much they constrain the firm’s 
operations. For instance, one question asks: “Is electricity “No obstacle”, a “Minor obstacle”, 
a “Moderate obstacle”, a “Major obstacle” or a “Very severe obstacle” to the current 
operations of your establishment?”. Similar information was elicited on the following business 
constraints: inadequately educated workforce; access to finance; transportation infrastructure; 
practices of competitors in the informal sector; access to land; crime, theft and disorder; 
business licences and permits; political instability; corruption; and courts. Because the scaling 
of the answer categories differs across survey rounds (either a five- or a four-point Likert scale) 
we rescale all measures to a 0-100 scale using the conversion formula (value – minimum 
value)/(maximum value – minimum value). 
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For each firm we construct Average business constraints, which measures the average of 
the above-mentioned 12 constraint categories. Like the underlying components, this average 
ranges between 0 and 100. Appendix A contains a histogram of the distribution of this variable. 
In addition, we create the measures Input constraints (access to land, access to an educated 
workforce, and access to finance); local Infrastructure constraints (electricity and transport); 
and Institutional constraints (crime, informal competitors, access to business licences, 
corruption, political instability and court quality). These three measures again range between 0 
and 100. The average complaint rate of a firm is 30.2 but there is wide variation; the standard 
deviation is 27.3. The most binding constraints are those related to access to inputs (34.7), 
followed by infrastructure constraints (29.5) and institutional constraints (23.4). 
We also create firm-level covariates for our regression framework. These include the firm 
Age in number of years and dummies to identify Small firms, Medium-sized firms and Large 
firms; International exporters (firms whose main market is abroad); Foreign firms (foreigners 
own 10 percent or more of all equity); and State firms (state entities own at least 10 per cent of 
the firm’s equity). We create the following industry dummies: Manufacturing; Construction; 
Retail and wholesale; Real estate, renting and business services; and Others.20 For each firm 
we know the name and geographical coordinates of its location (city or town). We exclude firms 
in capital cities. 
Lastly, the enterprise surveys not only measure the business constraints that firms 
experience on a daily basis but, for a subset of survey rounds, also their performance. We create 
log Employment, log Assets and log annual Sales as firm-level outcome measures. Table A1 in 
the Appendix provides an overview of all variable definitions while Table A2 provides 
summary statistics. 
 
3.3. Combining the mining and firm data 
A final step in our data construction is to merge—at the local level—information on individual 
firms with information on the mines that surround each firm. We identify all mines within a 
radius of 20 km (12.4 miles) and within a distance band of between 21 and 150 km (13.0 and 
93.2 miles, respectively) around each firm. For now we disregard sub-national administrative 
boundaries. Figure 1 provides a data snapshot for two sample countries, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan. The top panel shows the location of firms and mines and indicates that 
                                                             
20 Once we separate firms into traded, non-traded, construction and natural resource related sectors, we replace 
sector dummies with dummies for these categories. 
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geographical coverage is comprehensive. Firms are not concentrated in only a few cities nor 
are mines clustered in just a few regions. Zooming in to the squares in the bottom panel reveals 
substantial variation in distances between firms and mines. There are both firms with and 
without mines in their immediate vicinity (within a 20 km radius). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
We are agnostic about the spatial range within which mines affect firms and therefore start by 
exploring spatial rings used in the literature.21 We assess distance circles of radius 10, 20, 50, 
100, 150, 300 and 450 km. Exploratory regressions (in Appendix Table A5) show positive 
effects on firms’ constraints up to 20 km, after which the sign switches to negative effects up 
to 150 km. After 150 km the effects become very small. We therefore group mines into three 
distance bands: up to 20 km, 21-150 km and 151-450 km and find that only the first two bands 
show significant and economically meaningful results.22 All our results are robust to redefining 
these two distance bands by reducing or expanding them by 10 percent. 
Using our merged data, we then create variables that proxy for the extensive and intensive 
margin of mining activity in each of these two distance bands. At the extensive margin, we 
create dummy variables that indicate whether a firm has at least one active mine in its direct or 
its broader vicinity (Any active mine). In our sample, 24 percent of all firms have at least one 
mine within a 20 km radius while 77 percent have at least one mine within a 21-150 km radius. 
At the intensive margin, we measure the number of mines around firms (№ active mines). On 
average, each firm has 0.6 active mines within a 20 km radius but there is wide variation: this 
variable ranges between 0 and 19 mines. Within a 21-150 km distance band, the number of 
active mines is on average 7.6 and again ranges widely between zero and 152 mines. We also 
                                                             
21 Kotsadam and Tolonen (2013) and Tolonen (2015) show that the impact of African gold mines on labor markets 
is strongest within a radius of 15 to 20 km. Cust (2015) finds that labor market impacts are concentrated within a 
15 km radius around Indonesian mines. Aragón and Rud (2015) use a 20 km radius to study agricultural 
productivity near African gold mines while Goltz and Barnwall (2014) take a 5 km cutoff based on prior evidence 
on the spatial extent of pollution. Aragón and Rud (2013) analyze longer-distance impacts (100 km) of the Peruvian 
mine they study. Finally, Glaeser, Kerr and Kerr (2015) examine distances of up to 500 km between historical coal 
deposits and US cities. Papers that focus on district-level impacts due to fiscal channels typically also use longer 
distances (Loayza et al., 2013 and Allcott and Keniston, 2014). 
22 The same pattern emerges when including sector interactions in Panel B of Table A5. Comparing column (2) 
with (8) and (9) in both panels of Table A5 also shows that the results of the number of mines within 20 km on 
(traded) firms do not depend on inclusion of the outer band(s). Although there is some positive spatial correlation 
between the number of mines across the distance rings, this does not cause severe multicollinearity. 
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create similar variables that measure inactive mines and mines with an unknown operating 
status and use these as control variables in our analysis. 
Lastly, we measure total production in log metric megatons (Mt.) for nearby and more 
distant mines. We also multiply this annual output with the relevant (annual) world mining 
prices for each ore that is produced by a mine in order to calculate total production value. This 
introduces additional exogenous variation, driven by global price changes, in local mining 
output. 
 
4.  Empirical strategy 
We consider the following empirical model to estimate the impact of mining on firms’ business 
constraints within a certain distance band: 
 , 2fsct fsc t fsct sct fsctY M X d        (8) 
where fsctY  indicates for firm f in sector s in country c in year t either the local Average business 
constraints it experienced on a scale of 0 to 100 or, more specifically, its Input constraints, 
Infrastructure constraints or Institutional constraints. , 2fsc tM   contains a number of two-year 
lagged indicators of local mining activity within a 0-20 or 21-150 km spatial band around firm 
f.23 fsctX  is a matrix of firm covariates related to firm age, size and ownership. 
We saturate the model with country-year-sector fixed effects— sctd —to wipe out 
(un)observable variation at this aggregation level and to rule out that our results are driven by 
industry-specific demand shocks or country-specific production structures. These fixed effects 
also take care of any (unintended) differences in survey implementation across countries, years 
and sectors. In addition, we include (within-country) regional dummies that are ‘1’ if the region 
has at least one mine of any operating status; ‘0’ otherwise. These control for inherent 
geographical and other (for example, business climate) differences between resource-rich and 
resource-poor regions within one and the same country.24 Robust standard errors are clustered 
                                                             
23 While it may take time for mining activity to affect local firms, impacts and employment generation may already 
be substantial during the investment phase (Tolonen, 2015). Appendix Table A6 shows that our results are robust 
to changing the time lag to zero, one or three years. Because we do not know for each mine how long it has been 
active or closed (due to incomplete recording of the history before the year 2000) we do not attempt to separate 
short-run from medium or long-run effects. 
24 A total of 84 per cent of all firms in our data set are in a mining region. All our results go through when we limit 
our sample to these firms. 
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by country-year-sector. We are interested in the OLS estimate of β, which we interpret as the 
impact of local mining intensity on firms’ business constraints.25 
Our data allow us to test whether the impact of mining on firm-level constraints differs 
across sectors. As discussed in Section 2, theory suggests that the impact of local mining may 
be positive for non-tradeable sectors and construction but negative for firms in tradeable sectors. 
We therefore also estimate: 
 , 2fsct fsc t s s fsct sct fsctY M N N X d          (9) 
where sN  is one of four dummies that identify whether a firm is in a Tradeable sector, the 
Construction sector, a Non-traded sector or the Natural resource sector. We discuss this sector 
classification in more detail in Section 5.2. 
Our identification exploits that the local presence of mining deposits is plausibly exogenous 
and reflects random “geological anomalies” (Eggert, 2001; Black, McKinnish and Sanders, 
2005). The only assumption we need is that spatial exploration intensity within country-years 
is homogeneous in the sense that it is uncorrelated with pre-existing business constraints and 
other local characteristics and instead only depends on national institutions such as 
expropriation risk (Bohn and Deacon, 2000). We can then treat the local presence of mines as 
a quasi-experimental setting that allows us to identify the general equilibrium effects of 
exogenous geologic endowments on local businesses. To the extent that exploration intensity 
is driven by institutional quality, openness to FDI or environmental regulation, such effects will 
be taken care of by our country-year-sector fixed effects.  
 
5.  Results 
 
5.1. Baseline results 
Table 1 reports our baseline results on the impact of mining on local business constraints. In 
each regression, the dependent variable is the average of the business constraints as perceived 
by firms. We present different functional forms of our main independent variables: the number 
of active mines in the 0-20 km and the 21-150 km spatial bands around each firm. In the first 
four columns we use a count variable—the number of active mines—to measure local mining 
                                                             
25 Alternatively, one can estimate (8) with ordered logit to reflect that our constraints measure is the average of 
rescaled business constraints. However, after rescaling and averaging, the resulting business-constraint measure 
takes 327 different values, which makes logit results less straightforward to interpret. All our results are 
nevertheless robust to ordered logit estimation or to using a Tobit model with a lower (upper) limit of 0 (100). 
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activity. In the fourth column, we impute the operational status (active or inactive) on the basis 
of night-time light emissions in the direct vicinity (1 km radius) of the mine.26 In column 5 we 
take the log of the number of mines plus one to allow for possible concavity in mining impacts. 
In line with our discussion in Section 2, we find that mining activity near firms increases 
the business constraints experienced by these firms. In contrast, mining activity relaxes 
constraints at a longer distance: between 21 and 150 km we find mostly positive mining 
impacts.27 These findings hold regardless of the functional form of our mining variables and 
regardless of whether we saturate the model with country-year fixed effects (column 1), 
country-year-sector fixed effects (all other columns), exclude our standard set of firm covariates 
(column 3) or impute missing mining statuses (column 4). Column 5 shows that concavity in 
the mining impact does not change the baseline impacts. In column 6 we measure mining 
activity by the sum of night-time light emitted within a 1 km radius around mines. It is 
reassuring that this alternative way to calculate mining activity yields qualitatively very similar 
impacts.28 We therefore measure mining activity by the count of mines throughout the 
remainder of the paper.  
In column 7 the mining count variables are expressed as the log of the number of active 
minus where zero values are set to missing. We now also add two dummy variables that separate 
out localities with and without any mining activity. This effectively splits the earlier effect into 
impacts along the extensive and intensive margin. The economic and statistical significance of 
our earlier results hardly changes. That is, even when we control for the fact that locations with 
mining activity may be different from locations without mining, we find that—conditional on 
mines being present—more mining activity leads to tighter business constraints nearby and 
fewer constraints further away. 
In column 8 we control for the joint production of all mines in the vicinity of a firm (in log 
Mt. ore, setting missing observations to zero). Here too the number of mines continues to be a 
                                                             
26 Source: Earth Observation Group. Night-time light intensity (luminosity) as captured by satellite imagery is 
increasingly used to measure economic activity at the most disaggregated geographical level (Henderson, 
Storeygard and Weil, 2011). To impute the missing operating status for mines, we run a probit regression of mine 
operating status on the luminosity within a 1 km radius of the mine interacted with an open-pit (versus 
underground) dummy, and country-year fixed effects. The coefficient on lights is positive and highly significant 
for both types of mines with coefficients of 0.015 and 0.008, respectively, and this difference is significant. Open-
pit mines therefore emit almost twice as much night-time light. We then use this model to predict missing operating 
statuses and assume that a mine is operating if the predicted probability is above the median. This affects 119 
(2,520) observations in the 0-20 (21-150) km band. 
27 The unreported covariate coefficients show that larger firms are more and foreign-owned firms less constrained 
on average. Firm age does not matter much. 
28 The marginal effect of a one standard deviation increase in mines’ night-time light is 0.5 percentage points. 
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significant determinant of business constraints. The size of the coefficients only decreases 
slightly as compared with the equivalent regression in column 2. In addition, we find that—
conditional on the number of mines—larger mines tend to further deteriorate business 
constraints of nearby firms while improving them for firms further away.29 
In column 9 we control for the value of total production of all mines in the vicinity of the 
firm. We now multiply the amount of ore produced with the relevant world prices (in a 
particular year). The log total value of minerals mined is insignificant for both distance rings, 
while the number of mines continues to be a significant determinant of business constraints.  
Lastly, in column 10 we replace the value of mines with missing operating status with the 
median production of other mines in the same country that produce the same metal or mineral. 
We again multiply (imputed) production with the relevant world price so that variation now 
comes from the number of mines near firms, the metals and minerals they produce, and the 
world price. We replicate both the strong negative effects in the 0-20 distance band and the 
strong positive effects in the wider 21-150 band.30 
In sum, Table 1 shows that mining activity is robustly associated with a deterioration of the 
business environment in the immediate vicinity of firms but with an improvement at a larger 
distance. Conditioning on the presence of any mines, we find that this effect is stronger when 
there are more mines and when mines are larger in terms of total ore output. These results are 
in line with negative local resource-movement effects and positive regional-spending effects. 
A one standard deviation increase in nearby mining increases the average business constraint 
by 0.6 percentage points (compared with an average of 30.2) while more distant mining activity 
reduces constraints by 3.4 percentage points. The effect of mining on the local business 
environment hence appears modest for the average firm. However, theory predicts that the sign 
of the impact will depend on the sector of the firm. In Section 5.2 we therefore split the average 
effect by sector while in Section 5.3 we estimate the real effects of increased business 
constraints and find that these are substantial.  
 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
                                                             
29 While we know world prices of the minerals produced, we do not know production costs and thus cannot assume 
that an increase in value produced translates directly into a larger spending effect.  
30 The sample size is reduced here since we cannot impute when output information is missing for other mines that 
produce the same metal or mineral in the same country. 
18 
5.2. The impact of mining on tradeable versus non-tradeable sectors 
Our second hypothesis states that local mining activity affects tradeable and non-tradeable 
sectors in different ways. In order to test this prior, we need to decide whether firms belong to 
a tradeable or a non-tradeable sector. This split is not entirely straightforward as many goods 
can both be consumed locally and traded (inter)nationally. For example, a leather tannery may 
sell exclusively to a local downstream clothing manufacturer or may (also) sell internationally. 
To deal with this issue, we apply two methods to classify sectors and show that our results are 
robust to either method. 
First, we follow Mian and Sufi (2014) and classify the retail sector, restaurants, hotels and 
services of motor vehicles as non-tradeable (NT). Construction is classified separately (C), 
while non-metallic mineral products plus basic metals are labelled as natural resource sectors 
(R). All other sectors are then considered tradeables (T). In a slightly different version of this 
baseline classification, we further restrict tradeables to include only those sectors that export on 
average at least 5 percent of output (either directly or indirectly through intermediaries). In a 
third version, we exclude retail from non-tradeables and combine all excluded sectors in a 
separate Other category. 
Second, we define tradeables and non-tradeables according to their geographical 
concentration, following Ellison and Glaeser (1997). The idea is that producers of traded goods 
do not have to locate themselves close to consumers and can therefore agglomerate, while 
producers of non-traded goods spread across space to serve nearby consumers. A measure of 
agglomeration is then informative of the degree of tradeability. We construct an index that is a 
measure of excess concentration with respect to a random distribution of sectors across space. 
Let G be a measure of geographic concentration, where ssi is the share of industry s’s 
employment in region i and xi the share of aggregate employment in region i: 




Furthermore, let H be the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of industry concentration, where zsj is 





G and H can now be combined into the following Ellison-Glaeser agglomeration index: 
19 
𝛾𝑠 =
𝐺𝑠 − (1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑖 )𝐻𝑠
(1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖2𝑖 )(1 − 𝐻𝑠)
 
As Hs approaches zero (at high levels of aggregation, when the number of plants is large, or for 
an increasing number of equally sized establishments) γs approaches 𝐺𝑠/(1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖
2
𝑖 ) and is a 
rescaled measure of raw concentration. The index is unbounded on both sides, but E(γs)=0 when 
no agglomerative spillovers or natural advantages exist. Positive values suggest more 
concentration than a random distribution would predict, while negative values suggest that 
establishments locate themselves relatively diffusely. We calculate γs for each country-sector-
year to allow for different development stages of each country over time, which may translate 
into changing agglomeration patterns. As in Mian and Sufi (2014), we classify sectors as non-
traded if they are within the first decile (most dispersed) of the country-sector γs distribution. 
Appendix Table A7 lists the number of firms by classification method. Firms in construction 
and natural resources never change sector by definition. At the margin, different methodologies 
cause firms to switch between tradeable and non-tradeable status, but the differences in terms 
of sample size by classification do not change a lot. The average index value of the Ellison-
Glaeser index is close to zero (-0.018) for tradeable sectors, but much more negative (-1.183) 
for the non-tradeable sectors, indicating more dispersion. 
In Table 2 we first use our baseline classification based on Mian and Sufi (2014). Using this 
split, columns 1 to 3 show that only traded firms, which take world or national prices as a given, 
suffer from nearby mining activity while natural resource and non-traded firms benefit. These 
opposite impacts are consistent with the predictions of the standard Corden and Neary (1982) 
model as well as our model of Section 2. A one standard deviation increase in the number of 
active mines within a radius of 20 km leads to a 1.1 percentage point increase in the average 
business constraints for firms in tradeable sectors. This result holds independent of whether we 
include firm controls (column 2) or impute mining status with night-time lights (column 3). 
Each additional active mine within 20 km of a tradeable-sector firm increases business 
constraints by an additional 0.6 percentage points. In contrast, an increase in local mining 
activity reduces business constraints by 2.1 percentage points for firms in non-tradeable sectors 
and by 0.4 percentage points for natural resource firms (see column 1 in Table 5, where we 
report the marginal effects). 
At a longer distance, all firm types benefit from local mining activity although this effect is 
imprecisely estimated for firms in the non-traded sectors. A one standard deviation increase in 
mining activity in the 21-150 km band leads to a decline in business constraints of 3.8, 4.6 and 
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5.0 percentage points for firms in the traded, construction and natural resource sectors, 
respectively. 
Robustness checks in Appendix Table A8 indicate that the findings based on the Mian and 
Sufi (2014) classification are robust to applying other classification methods. In particular, the 
effect of mines in the direct vicinity of tradeable-sector firms is reassuringly similar across all 
specifications. In the rest of our analysis, we therefore use our baseline classification. 
In column 4 of Table 2 we measure local mining activity as the night-time light emitted 
within 1 km around mines. The results are very similar to the earlier regressions based on 
counting the number of mines: a one standard deviation increase in mining leads to an 0.8 
percentage point increase in business constraints. Appendix Table A9 shows that this result, as 
well as our previous findings, also holds when we control for general local economic activity 
as measured by night-time light emitted in a 20 km radius around firms. 
In column 5 we exclude the 10 percent largest and youngest companies. Excluding younger 
firms reduces the risk that firms have moved to or from newly established mines thus 
undermining our assumption that mining activity is exogenous. Excluding the largest firms 
disregards firms that are least sensitive to the local business environment. When we exclude 
these two types of firms, our results continue to hold. The negative effect of local mining on 
the business constraints of natural resource companies now disappears. This reflects that some 
of the largest and youngest firms in our data set are mining-related companies as well as newly 
established upstream and downstream companies. Removing these firms makes it difficult to 
precisely estimate the impact of mining on the business environment as perceived by these 
firms. Note also that if some traded firms moved away due to the opening of mines, we would 
underestimate the negative effect on traded-sector firms. 
In column 6 we exclude firms that operate as multi-plant establishments and that have their 
headquarters in another region than where the interview took place. Our findings continue to 
hold here as well. Next, in column 7 we replace our country-year-sector fixed effects with 
region-year-sector fixed effects. We now compare firms with and without local mines in the 
same year, in the same sector and in the same geographical region within a country. Our main 
results go through in this very restrictive specification.31 
Lastly, in columns 8a and 8b we split the mine count near firms according to whether mines 
are inside (8a) or outside (8b) the administrative region in which the firm is located. Column 9 
                                                             
31 As regions we use the highest administrative level in each country: states in Brazil and Mexico (estado), regions 
in Chile (región), mainland provinces in China, oblasts in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, provinces in Mongolia and 
federal subjects in Russia. 
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then provides an F-test for the equality of the estimated coefficients. This shows that within the 
21-150 km band, there is not much difference between the impact of intra-region and extra-
region mines: their presence reduces business constraints in both cases. As expected, this impact 
is more precisely estimated for mines that are not only nearby but also within the same 
administrative region. 
Within the 20 km circle, we find two important effects. First, traded firms are not only 
negatively affected by nearby mines in their own region but even more so by nearby mines that 
are just across the administrative border. This indicates that the negative impact of mining on 
the producers of tradeable goods does not simply reflect worsening institutions at the local 
administrative level. Second, the sign of the impact on non-traded firms depends on whether 
the mines are within or outside the administrative region. Nearby mines inside the same 
administrative region benefit non-trading firms (probably reflecting positive spending effects 
at the administrative level) whereas nearby mines just outside the administrative boundary hurt 
non-traded firms (just like they hurt nearby traded firms). 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Next, we unpack the average business constraint variable in order to understand how local 
mining affects firms in different sectors. To get at the underlying mechanisms we create three 
sub-indices of business constraints related to inputs (access to land, an adequately educated 
workforce and finance), infrastructure (electricity and transport) and institutions (crime, 
competition from the informal sector, ease of obtaining an operating licence, corruption, 
political instability, court quality). Each of these indices is an unweighted average of the 
underlying constraints and ranges between 0 and 100. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that firms in traded sectors suffer from mines in their 
immediate vicinity due to increased difficulties in accessing inputs (column 1, in particular 
qualified employees) and infrastructure (column 2, in particular transport). To a lesser extent 
they also complain more about institutional constraints such as those related to crime (column 
3). Perhaps not surprisingly, both firms in the construction and in the natural resource sector 
suffer significantly less from a constrained access to inputs when they are near mines. 
The beneficial effects of mining at a slightly larger distance manifest themselves mainly in 
the form of fewer problems in accessing inputs, especially land and a suitable workforce. To a 
lesser extent more distant firms also complain less about competition from the informal sector. 
The fact that we do not find strong effects with regard to infrastructure provision (column 2) 
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suggests that governments in our country sample do not use natural resource revenues to invest 
heavily in regional public infrastructure. Only the natural resource sector itself reports fewer 
infrastructure constraints, which may point towards purpose-built infrastructure rather than 
open access transportation links. This contrasts with the findings of Michaels (2011) who shows 
that public goods provision prolonged the positive effects of a local resource boom in the United 
States during the last century.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.3. Real effects 
An important empirical question is whether the impact of mining on local business constraints 
also translates into measureable effects on firm performance in terms of employment, assets 
and sales. To analyze this issue, we follow Commander and Svejnar (2011, henceforth CS) who 
examine the impact of local business constraints on firm performance using BEEPS data for 26 
European transition countries. They find that country fixed effects absorb nearly all the 
variation in business constraints across firms within countries and hence conclude that country-
level institutions (and other characteristics) are responsible for holding back firms. 
We first replicate their findings based on our sample, which includes a larger number of 
BEEPS/Enterprise Survey rounds and a smaller but more diverse set of countries. It is therefore 
worthwhile to examine if this additional variation leads to different results. Contrary to CS, we 
use a 2SLS approach where in the first stage we instrument business constraints with local 
mining activity (and the interaction terms of mining activity with economic sector dummies). 
In the second stage we then treat average business constraints as the endogenous variable that 
explains firm performance. The sample size is much reduced when we include assets and sales, 
because few firms report these numbers and because the 2005 survey wave did not include 
questions about assets or sales in China, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. 
Table 4 summarizes our results. Column 1 reports our first-stage regression, which also 
includes interaction terms between local mining activity and the four main economic sectors. 
The specification contains country-year-sector fixed effects as well as our standard firm-level 
covariates. We exclude firm size as it is likely to be a “bad control” that is affected by mining 
activity itself and can thus introduce selection bias. 
As before, we find that mining activity in a 21-150 km band around firms reduces average 
business constraints for all firms whereas mining in the immediate vicinity (<20 km) hurts firms 
in tradeable sectors but benefits those in non-tradeable sectors. Local mining activity is overall 
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a strong predictor of average business constraints. This is confirmed by the robust first stage F-
test on the excluded instruments, which is consistently and comfortably above the rule-of-
thumb of 10. Our instruments (mining activity and the sectoral interaction terms) appear valid 
according to a Hansen’s J-test for overidentifying restrictions. 
In the second stage, we regress the log of employment, total assets or sales on the average 
of reported constraints (columns 2-3-4).32 As before, we include firm-level covariates related 
to ownership and age and we saturate the model with country-year-sector dummies (similar to 
the OLS regressions of CS that include country-year fixed effects). Including this rich set of 
controls and fixed effects allows us to examine whether constraints as predicted by local mining 
activity matter when controlling for national institutions. 
The results show that predicted business constraints reduce employment, assets and sales. 
The effects are economically quite large. A one standard deviation increase in local mining 
activity reduces employment by 2.2 per cent, assets by 6.3 per cent and sales by 2.6 per cent for 
a producer of tradeables.33 In contrast, there are sizeable positive impacts of mining on both 
assets and sales of firms producing non-tradeables and firms in the natural resource sector. 
Table 5 provides a summary of all marginal effects. 
 
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
Table A10 in the Appendix shows a number of alternative IV specifications. Throughout the 
table we replace country-year-sector fixed effects with sector fixed effects. This yields more 
precisely estimated second-stage results. We think, however, that it is important to use country-
year-sector fixed effects in our baseline specification in Table 4 to adequately control for 
country-specific unobserved effects, such as institutions and macroeconomic fluctuations. 
While this somewhat reduces the statistical significance of the main estimates (in line with CS) 
we nevertheless continue to find relatively precisely estimated negative real impacts. 
                                                             
32 Employment is the sum of permanent full-time employees plus the number of part-time or temporary employees 
at the end of the last fiscal year. Assets are the replacement value of machinery, vehicles and equipment in the last 
fiscal year in US dollars. Sales are annual sales in the last fiscal year in US dollars. All our results are robust to 
using the book value instead of the replacement value of assets. 
33 These negative real impacts also indicate that an increase in self-reported business constraints does not simply 
reflect a booming local economy in which firms struggle to meet demand. If this drove our results in Tables 1 and 
2, then we should find that lower reported business constraints lead to positive instead of negative real effects. In 
other words, instrumenting firm-level constraints reduces concerns about endogeneity of firms’ demand for inputs 
in the sense that more productive firms need more inputs and thus feel more constrained. 
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In columns 5 and 6 we use firm-size dummies. A comparison with the preceding two 
columns shows that adding these potentially “bad controls” reduces the coefficients. This 
suggests that controlling for firm size may introduce some positive selection bias and lead to 
an underestimation of the effect of business constraints on real firm outcomes. 
 
5.4. Robustness: Panel data 
While our main firm data set consists of repeated but independently sampled rounds of cross-
sectional survey data, a subset of firms were interviewed at least twice (in separate survey 
rounds) in Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia and Ukraine. We can use this small panel to 
observe the same firms at different points in time and compare how firms that experienced an 
increase in local mining activity differ from firms that did not. Importantly, this difference-in-
differences framework allows us to include firm fixed effects to control more tightly for time 
invariant firm and locality characteristics. 
Table 6 shows the results. Controlling for firm fixed effects, we continue to find an impact 
of mining on firms’ business constraints (columns 1 and 2). We now also find a much larger 
effect: a one standard deviation increase in mining activity is associated with a 6.3 percentage 
point increase in constraints for the average firm (column 1). Column 2 confirms our earlier 
finding that this negative impact is driven by firms in the tradeable sector, in line with local 
resource movement effects. The spending effects in the wider area are less clear cut, reflecting 
the smaller sample size in these panel regressions. Columns 3 to 5 present a similar IV 
framework as in Table 4 (we use the specification in column 2 as the first stage). We find similar 
negative impacts on firm growth although, again, the estimates are less precise due to the 
smaller panel data set. 
 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
5.5. Robustness: Controlling for oil and gas fields 
One may be concerned that our results are confounded by mining localities that also produce 
oil and gas. Oil and gas tend to occur in higher concentrations of wealth than metals and other 
minerals, which may lead to larger local spending effects. On the other hand, production tends 
to be more capital intensive and this may imply smaller effects on local labor demand. 
To assess whether our results are sensitive to the local presence of large-scale hydrocarbon 
production, we extend our regressions with the number of oil and gas fields within distance 
bands of each firm. We use data from Horn (2003) who reports both the geographic coordinates 
25 
and the size of 874 giant onshore and offshore oil and gas fields (with a minimum pre-extraction 
size of 500 million barrels of oil equivalent).34 
In Table 7 we report our baseline regressions while adding the number of active oil and gas 
fields (column 1), total oil and gas reserves (column 2) or the remaining oil and gas reserves 
(column 3). In each case we include these variables both measured within a 20 km distance of 
the firm and for a 21-150 km spatial distance ring. Controlling for giant oil and gas fields does 
not alter our main result that nearby mining activity constrains firms in tradeable sectors but 
helps firms in the non-tradeable sector as well as firms downstream and upstream of natural 
resource companies. 
We also find that the presence of oil and gas fields decreases reported business constraints. 
However, closer inspection of the data reveals that only few firms have any oil and gas fields 
nearby (Table A11). While there is on average 0.5 mines within 20 km of a firm, there is only 
0.01 oil and gas fields within that distance. In fact, no firms in Brazil, Chile, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico or Mongolia have any fields within 20 km. This suggests that most fields are located in 
remote regions and that the negative effect is driven by very few observations. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
We estimate the local impact of mining activity on the business constraints of over 20,000 firms 
in eight resource-rich countries. We exploit spatial variation in local mining activity within 
these countries to facilitate causal inference in both a cross-sectional and a panel setting. To the 
best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to estimate this impact of mining activity on firm 
performance across a variety of countries. Our results are clearly at odds with views that 
consider mines as “enclaves” without any tangible links to local economies. Instead we find 
that the presence of active mines deteriorates the business environment of firms in close 
proximity (<20 km) to a mine but relaxes business constraints for more distant firms. The 
negative local impacts are concentrated exclusively among firms in tradeable sectors. In line 
with mining-related congestion effects and infrastructure bottlenecks, the ability of these firms 
to access inputs, labor and infrastructure is hampered. This mining-induced deterioration of the 
local business environment also stunts the growth of these firms: they generate less 
                                                             
34 Oil, condensate and gas are summed using a factor of 1/.006 to convert gas trillion cubic feet to oil equivalent 
million barrels. 
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employment, sell fewer goods and own fewer assets. In sharp contrast, firms in the services 
sector and in upstream and downstream natural resource sectors benefit from local mining. 
In line with the Dutch disease model of Corden and Neary (1982), our results provide 
evidence for negative-resource movement effects in the immediate vicinity of mines (a “local 
curse”) as well as positive spending effects in a wider geographical area (a “regional blessing”). 
We believe that these findings can contribute to a better understanding of why studies of the 
local impact of mining often find positive effects on household income, while many aggregate 
studies find adverse effects on national income growth. Our results suggest that only traded 
sector manufacturing firms suffer from mining, and only at a localized level, while the non-
traded and construction sectors benefit. Because most firms are traded we find that the net 
average effect is negative at the local level. Moreover, the spending effect may increase demand 
for all sectors in the wider economy. 
From a policy perspective our results indicate that, on average and across countries, mining 
activity can have a positive impact on local economies. To minimize localized negative effects 
on the business environment, policy-makers should think about ways to let local producers 
share extraction-related infrastructure. This may reduce the infrastructure bottlenecks and 
congestion effects that we observe in the data. Improving transport, electricity, water and other 
enabling infrastructure may not only help firms in tradeable sectors but also further stimulate 
local services sectors and clusters of downstream and upstream industries that are related to 
mines. To maximize positive spillovers, policy-makers can also help firms to become fit to 
supply local mining-related supply chains. These measures can help meet the preconditions for 
a resource boom to trigger agglomeration and positive long-term impacts. 
Finally, the geographical and sector distribution of the economy at the time of natural 
resource discoveries also matters for whether resource booms have aggregate negative growth 
effects or not. Moreover, to what extent any negative effects persist depends on whether the 
contraction of tradeable sectors during the boom will be reversed once a boom ends. Tradeable 
sectors may remain depressed for a protracted period if during the boom local residents have 
specialized in resource-related skills that are not easily transferable to other sectors. Policy has 
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Appendix B. Survey questions 
We use the following BEEPS V survey questions to measure firm-level business constraints. In 
each case the following answer categories were offered: No obstacle, Minor obstacle, Moderate 
obstacle, Major obstacle, Very severe obstacle, Don’t know, Does not apply. For earlier survey 
rounds and for the World Bank Enterprise Surveys we use equivalent questions. 
Question C.30a: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is electricity an 
obstacle to the current operations of this establishment?  
Question D.30a: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is transport an obstacle 
to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question E.30: Using the response options on the card, to what degree are practices of 
competitors in the informal sector an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question G.30a: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is access to land an 
obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question I.30: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is crime, theft and 
disorder an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question K.30: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is access to finance an 
obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question J.30c: Using the response options on the card, to what degree are business licencing 
and permits an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question J.30e: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is political instability 
an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question J.30f: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is corruption an 
obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question H.30: Using the response options on the card, to what degree are courts an obstacle 
to the current operations of this establishment? 
Question L.30b: Using the response options on the card, to what degree is an inadequately 
educated workforce an obstacle to the current operations of this establishment? 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
№ active mines 0-20 km 0.349** 0.348** 0.376** 0.353** 1.031** 0.008* 0.912** 0.287** 0.334* -
(0.134) (0.135) (0.144) (0.153) (0.461) (0.004) (0.355) (0.130) (0.181) -
№ active mines 21-150 km -0.247** -0.247** -0.239** -0.248** -2.370*** -0.009** -2.388*** -0.229** -0.266** -
(0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.110) (0.810) (0.005) (0.833) (0.105) (0.128) -
Any active mine 0-20 km 0.739*
(0.441)
Any active mine 21-150 km 1.170*
(0.661)
Mining production 0-20 km (ln) 1.501*
(0.864)
Mining production 21-150 km (ln) -0.787***
(0.187)
Value mining production 0-20 km (ln) -0.309
(0.263)






Definition "№ active mines" Count Count Count Count NTL Log(n+1) NTL Log(n) Count Count -
Country-Year-Sector FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes No No No No No No No No No
Firm controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Observations 22,150 22,150 23,045 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 5,050
R-squared 0.269 0.272 0.295 0.272 0.273 0.271 0.274 0.274 0.273 0.220
Table 1
Local mining and business constraints
Average business constraints
Imputed value mining production 21-150 km (ln)
Imputed value mining production 0-20 km (ln)
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints. In columns 1-2-3-8-9 No. active mines 0-20 km (21-150 km) are count
variables. Column 3 excludes our standard set of firm covariates. In column 4 above-ground mines with missing operating status are given an imputed status based on night-time light (NTL)
predictions. In column 5 the No. active mines variables are expressed as the log of the number of active minus plus 1. In column 6 mining activity is measured by NTL emitted within a 1 km radius
around mines. In column 7 the No. active mines variables are expressed as the log of the number of active minus where zero values are set to missing (while adding separate dummy variables Any
active mine 0-20 km (21-150 km)). Column 8 controls for mining production measured in log metric megatons, where missing observations are replaced with zeros. Column 9 controls for the value
of log mining production (mining production times world price), where missing observations are replaced with zeros. In column 10 mining activity is measured as the value of log mining
production (mining production times world price) where for each mine, independent of its operating status, the median metal production by country-metal is taken and multiplied with the world
price. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications
include country-year-sector fixed effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms (not in column 10) and a dummy for
whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Sectors are Manufacturing; Construction; Retail and wholesale; Real estate, renting and business services; Other. Tables
A1 (A2) in the Appendix contain variable definitions and data sources (summary statistics).























Interaction with: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8a] [8b] [9]
№ active mines 0-20 km x Traded 0.588*** 0.611*** 0.602*** 0.013*** 0.573*** 0.596*** 0.352** 0.432*** 1.210*** 19.17***
(0.158) (0.183) (0.174) (0.005) (0.209) (0.151) (0.137) (0.135) (0.290)
x Construction -0.322 -0.287 -0.312 -0.021** -0.418 -0.415 0.075 -0.269 -0.127 0.01
(0.378) (0.389) (0.398) (0.008) (0.367) (0.391) (0.496) (0.363) (0.924)
x Non-traded -1.171** -0.642* -1.122** -0.019 -1.346** -1.058** -0.925 -1.610*** 0.750** 11.85***
(0.527) (0.343) (0.511) (0.013) (0.652) (0.500) (0.848) (0.461) (0.346)
x Natural resources -0.209*** -0.193*** -0.199*** -0.007*** -0.083 -0.208*** 0.016 -0.211** -0.336 0.11
(0.034) (0.041) (0.044) (0.001) (0.070) (0.033) (0.072) (0.085) (0.292)
№ active mines 21-150 km x Traded -0.275** -0.272** -0.280** -0.010** -0.250** -0.278** -0.131* -0.303** -0.235** 0.66
(0.115) (0.115) (0.110) (0.005) (0.113) (0.115) (0.071) (0.122) (0.111)
x Construction -0.332** -0.336** -0.346*** -0.011** -0.278** -0.333** -0.310 -0.422** -0.213 0.68
(0.132) (0.134) (0.127) (0.005) (0.125) (0.133) (0.376) (0.209) (0.153)
x Non-traded -0.132 -0.129 -0.142 -0.003 -0.091 -0.124 -0.228** -0.199* -0.054 1.02
(0.093) (0.093) (0.086) (0.003) (0.080) (0.092) (0.098) (0.108) (0.107)
x Natural resources -0.360*** -0.340*** -0.366*** -0.016*** -0.367*** -0.363*** -0.153*** -0.325*** -0.388*** 2.98*
(0.089) (0.089) (0.087) (0.006) (0.114) (0.087) (0.048) (0.096) (0.083)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Region-Year-Sector FE No No No No No No Yes
Firm controls Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,812 21,704 20,812 20,812 15,847 20,305 20,812
R-squared 0.288 0.310 0.288 0.285 0.329 0.285 0.368








Local mining and business constraints: Sector heterogeneity
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints. In column 3 above-ground mines with missing operating status are given an imputed status based on night-time
light (NTL) predictions. In column 4 mining activity is measured by the sum of NTL emitted within a 1 km radius around mines. The sample used in column 5 excludes the 10 percent largest and youngest firms while the sample in
column 6 excludes multi-establishment firms. Column 7 includes region fixed effects, where a region is nested within a country and measures up to 5 by 5 degrees. There are 114 regions in total. In columns 8a and 8b local mine
counts are split according to whether they are inside (8a) or outside (8b) the administrative region of the firm. Column 9 shows F-statistics for a test of equal coefficients in columns 8a and 8b. Robust standard errors are clustered by
country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership), controls
for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not shown. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions
and data sources while Table A2 contains summary statistics.
Inputs Infrastructure Institutions
Interaction with: [1] [2] [3]
№ active mines 0-20 km x Traded 0.635*** 0.672** 0.222***
(0.119) (0.306) (0.082)
x Construction -1.301*** 0.317 -0.139
(0.402) (0.606) (0.514)
x Non-traded -0.726* -1.317 -1.399**
(0.384) (1.169) (0.626)
x Natural resources -0.229*** -0.155* -0.267***
(0.048) (0.090) (0.040)
№ active mines 21-150 km x Traded -0.287*** -0.267 -0.199**
(0.026) (0.270) (0.082)
x Construction -0.325*** -0.257 -0.299**
(0.066) (0.258) (0.123)
x Non-traded -0.228*** -0.093 -0.058
(0.054) (0.183) (0.081)
x Natural resources -0.304*** -0.450** -0.249***
(0.026) (0.176) (0.066)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,808 20,810 20,808
R-squared 0.176 0.155 0.373
Table 3
Average business constraints related to:
Local mining and business constraints: Inputs, infrastructure and institutions
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints related to
inputs (access to land, access to adequately educated workforce, access to finance), infrastructure (electricity and transport) and
institutions (crime, competition from informal sector, ease of obtaining an operating licence, corruption, political instability, court
quality). Robust standard errors are clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%,
5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed effects, firm controls (size,
age, international exporter, and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, and a dummy for whether a mine
of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not shown. Table A1 in the Appendix contains
all variable definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains summary statistics.





Assets (ln) Sales (ln)
1st stage
[1] [2] [3] [4]
-0.020** -0.059*** -0.025**















x Natural resources -0.352***
(0.088)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm and inactive mine controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,820 20,820 4,378 8,023
№ clusters 44 44 23 42
144.1





№ active mines 0-20 km
№ active mines 21-150 km
Notes: This table shows 2SLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firm growth. Robust standard errors are
shown in parentheses and clustered by country-year-sector. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance,
respectively. All sales and assets specifications include firm controls (size, age and ownership) and controls for inactive mines in the
vicinity of firms, unless otherwise stated. All employment specifications include firm controls (age, international exporter, and
ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the
administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not shown. Standard Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable
definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains summary statistics.
№ active mines 0-20 km x All sectors 0.6 ** -1.2% ** -3.7% ** -1.6% **
x Traded 1.1 *** -2.1% *** -6.2% *** -2.6% **
x Construction -0.6 1.2% 3.4% 1.4%
x Non-traded -2.1 ** 4.2% ** 12.4% ** 5.2% **
x Natural resources -0.4 *** 0.7% *** 2.2% *** 0.9% **
№ active mines 21-150 km x All sectors -3.5 ** 6.9% ** 20.4% ** 8.6% **
x Traded -3.8 ** 7.7% ** 22.7% ** 9.6% **
x Construction -4.6 ** 9.3% ** 27.4% ** 11.6% **
x Non-traded -1.8 3.7% 10.9% 4.6%
x Natural resources -5.0 *** 10.1% *** 29.7% *** 12.6% **
Mean 30.22 4.89 12.76 13.77
Table 5














Notes: This table shows marginal effects of a one standard deviation increase in mining by sector. Coefficients for column [1] are
taken from Table 1 column 2 (‘all sectors’) and Table 2 column 1 (by sector). Coefficients for columns [2-4] are taken from Table
4 columns 2-4, respectively. ***, **, *, correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. For columns 2-4
the significance level is the minimum of the direct and the indirect effect. For example, mines within 20 km have no significant
effect on constraints reported by the construction sector. We therefore conclude that employment, assets and sales of the
construction sector are also not significantly affected by mining.
Dependent variable → Employ-
ment (ln)
Assets (ln) Sales (ln)













x Natural resources [ - ]






x Natural resources -0.132
(6.247)
Country-sector-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies Yes Yes No No No
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 798 798 794 327 675
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic - 21.66
Hansen J-test p-value - 0.194
R-squared 0.802 0.803 - - -







Robustness: Panel data regressions
№ active mines 0-20 km
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions, based on a subset of firms that were surveyed in at least two years, to estimate the impact of
(increased) local mining activity on firms' business constraints. Column 2 provides the first-stage regression for the IV results in columns
3-4-5. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and
10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed effects, firm fixed effects and time-varying
firm controls (age, international exporter, and ownership), and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative
region of the firm. Capital cities are excluded. Constant included but not shown. Standard Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable
definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains summary statistics.
Interaction with: [1] [2] [3]
№ active mines 0-20 km x Traded 0.612*** 0.609*** 0.609***
(0.143) (0.130) (0.128)
x Construction -0.322 -0.314 -0.296
(0.358) (0.345) (0.341)
x Non-traded -1.087* -1.049* -1.021*
(0.554) (0.586) (0.595)
x Natural resources -0.188*** -0.173*** -0.178***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.026)
№ active mines 21-150 km x Traded -0.271** -0.258** -0.255**
(0.114) (0.113) (0.110)
x Construction -0.320** -0.306** -0.304**
(0.128) (0.127) (0.123)
x Non-traded -0.129 -0.122 -0.122
(0.090) (0.089) (0.088)
x Natural resources -0.366*** -0.354*** -0.353***
(0.088) (0.085) (0.083)
№ oil and gas fields 0-20 km -6.877***
(1.218)
№ oil and gas fields 21-150 km -1.042***
(0.290)
Oil and gas reserves 0-20 km (ln) -1.298**
(0.530)
Oil and gas reserves 21-150 km (ln) -0.315***
(0.100)
Oil and gas remaining reserves 0-20 km (ln) -2.111***
(0.588)
Oil and gas remaining reserves 21-150 km (ln) -0.512***
(0.130)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,812 20,812 20,812
R-squared 0.291 0.291 0.292
Table 7
Robustness: Controlling for giant oil and gas fields
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints while controlling
for the local presence of giant oil and gas fields. Oil and gas reserves measure the total size of fields by their ultimate recovery
equivalent, which is the original size of the field as it was known in 2003. Oil and gas remaining reserves is an estimate of the current
field size by applying a half-life time of 10 years, which corresponds to the average half-life of fields in North America, Europe, and the
former Soviet Union. See Horn (2003) for details. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses.
***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed
effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership) and controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms. Constant
included but not shown. Standard Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains
summary statistics.
Figure 1
Geographical distribution of firms and mines
These graphs depict the geographical distribution of the firms and mines in our dataset for Ukraine (left) and Kazakhstan (right). Scale varies by country. Similar maps are available for Brazil, Chile, China, Mexico, Mongolia and Russia in the
online Appendix. Red triangles (blue dots) indicate individual firms (mines). The lower maps zoom in to the area highlighted by the red rectangles in the upper maps. The circles around firms have a 20 km radius. Source: EBRD-World Bank
BEEPS Surveys and SNL Metals and Mining.
Ukraine Kazakhstan
Definition Source Unit 
Dependent variable:
Average business constraints Firm's perception of severity of business constraints (rescaled to 0, 100) Enterprise Surveys -
Input constraints Firm's perception of severity of constraints related to access to land, an educated work force and finance (rescaled to 0, 100) Enterprise Surveys -
Infrastructure constraints Firm's perception of severity of constraints related to electricity and transport (rescaled to 0, 100) Enterprise Surveys -
Institutional constraints Firm's perception of severity of constraints related to crime, informal competitors, access to business licences, corruption, political instability and court quality (rescaled to 0, 100) Enterprise Surveys -
Independent variables:
№ active mines 0-20 km Number of open mines around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius SNL -
№ active mines 21-150 km Number of open mines around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius SNL -
Any active mine 0-20 km Dummy variable that is '1' if there is at least one open mine around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius; '0' otherwise. SNL 0/1
Any active mine 21-150 km Dummy variable that is '1' if there is at least one open mine around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius; '0' otherwise SNL 0/1
№ inactive or unknown mines 0-20 km Number of closed mines and mines with unknown operating status around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius SNL -
№ inactive or unknown mines 21-150 km Number of closed mines and mines with unknown operating status around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius SNL -
Any inactive or unknown mine 0-20 km Dummy variable that is '1' if there is at least one closed mine or mine with unknown operating status around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius; '0' otherwise. SNL 0/1
Any inactive or unknown mine 21-150 km Dummy variable that is '1' if there is at least one closed mine or mine with unknown operating status around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius; '0' otherwise SNL 0/1
Mining production 0-20 km (ln) Mining production (log metric megatons) around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius. Production of mines with missing operating status set to zero. SNL -
Mining production 21-150 km (ln) Mining production (log metric megatons) around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius. Production of mines with missing operating status set to zero. SNL -
Value mining production 0-20 km (ln) Value of mining production (log of mining production times world price) around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius. Production value of mines with missing operating status set to zero. SNL -
Value mining production 21-150 km (ln) Value of mining production (log of mining production times world price) around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius. Production value of mines with missing operating 




№ oil and gas fields 0-20 km Number of oil and gas fields with a minimum pre-extraction size of 500 barrels of oil around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius Horn (2003) -
№ oil and gas fields 21-150 km Number of oil and gas fields with a minimum pre-extraction size of 500 barrels of oil around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius Horn (2003) -
Oil and gas reserves 0-20 km (ln) Log '1' plus total oil and gas reserves around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius. Reserves measure the total size of fields by their ultimate recovery equivalent, which is the original size of the field 
as it was known in 2003.
Horn (2003) -
Oil and gas reserves 21-150 km (ln) Log '1' plus total oil and gas reserves around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius.  Reserves measure the total size of fields by their ultimate recovery equivalent, which is the 
original size of the field as it was known in 2003.
Horn (2003) -
Oil and gas remaining reserves 0-20 km (ln) Log '1' plus total oil and gas remaining reserves around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius. Remaining reserves are estimated on the basis of current field size by applying a half-life time of 10 years, 
which corresponds to the average half-life of fields in North America, Europe, and the former Soviet Union.
Horn (2003) -
Oil and gas remaining reserves 21-150 km (ln) Log '1' plus total oil and gas remaining reserves around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 and 150 km radius. Remaining reserves are estimated on the basis of current field size by applying a half-
life time of 10 years, which corresponds to the average half-life of fields in North America, Europe, and the former Soviet Union.
Horn (2003) -
Night-time light Night-time light intensity as captured by satellite imagery NGDC EOG
Small firm Dummy variable that is '1' if firm employs between 5 and 19 people; '0' otherwise Enterprise Surveys 0/1
Medium-sized firm Dummy variable that is '1' if firm employs between 20 and 99 people; '0' otherwise Enterprise Surveys 0/1
Large firm Dummy variable that is '1' if firm employs 100 or more people; '0' otherwise Enterprise Surveys 0/1
Firm age Number of years since the firm was established Enterprise Surveys -
Foreign firm Dummy variable that is '1' if foreigners own 10 percent or more of the firm's equity; '0' otherwise Enterprise Surveys 0/1
State firm Dummy variable that is '1' if state entities own 10 percent or more of the firm's equity; '0' otherwise Enterprise Surveys 0/1
Firm competes internationally Dummy variable that is '1' if main product sold mostly on international markets or more than 25% of sales are earned overseas; '0' otherwise Enterprise Surveys 0/1
Employment (ln) Number of permanent full-time employees plus the number of part-time or temporary employees of the firm at the end of the last fiscal year Enterprise Surveys -
Assets (ln) Total replacement value of the physical equipment owned and used by the firm (in US$) Enterprise Surveys -
Sales (ln) Total annual turnover of the firm (in US$) Enterprise Surveys -
Notes:  This table gives the definition, source and unit for each of the variables used in the analysis. SNL: SNL Metals and Mining database. NGDC EOG: National Geophysical Data Center Earth Observation Group.
Imputed value mining production 21-150 km 
(ln)
Value of mining production (log of mining production times world price) around the firm within a circle with a 20 km radius. For each mine, independent of its operating status, the median metal production 
by country-metal is taken and multiplied with the world price.
Value of mining production (log of mining production times world price) around the firm between concentric circles with a 20 km and 150 km radius. For each mine, independent of its operating status, the 
median metal production by country-metal is taken and multiplied with the world price.
Table A1
Variable definitions and data sources
Imputed value mining production 0-20 km (ln)
Obs. Mean Median St. dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables:
Average business constraints 22,150 30.22 20.69 27.27 0 100
Input constraints 20,808 34.68 33.33 24.33 0 100
Infrastructure constraints 20,810 29.54 25.00 27.40 0 100
Institutional constraints 20,808 23.38 25.00 24.81 0 100
Independent variables:
№ active mines 0-20 km 22,150 0.58 0 1.79 0 19
№ active mines 21-150 km 22,150 7.56 4 13.98 0 152
№ inactive or unknown mines 0-20 km 22,150 0.12 0 0.77 0 12
№ inactive or unknown mines 21-150 km 22,150 2.69 1 7.22 0 88
Any inactive or unknown mine 0-20 km 22,150 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
Any inactive or unknown mine 21-150 km 22,150 0.77 1 0.42 0 1
Mining production 0-20 km (ln) 22,150 0.02 0 0.30 -1.20 4.14
Mining production 21-150 km (ln) 22,150 0.36 0 1.20 -2.83 6.06
Value mining production 0-20 km (ln) 22,150 1.06 0 2.02 0.00 8.06
Value mining production 21-150 km (ln) 22,150 1.37 0 2.70 0.00 10.04
Imputed value mining production 0-20 km (ln) 5,050 18.47 18.35 0.96 14.58 20.90
Imputed value mining production 21-150 km (ln) 5,050 20.10 20.11 1.13 15.27 22.19
№ oil and gas fields 0-20 km 22,150 0.01 0 0.14 0 2
№ oil and gas fields 21-150 km 22,150 0.27 0 0.70 0 4
Oil and gas reserves 0-20 km (ln) 22,150 0.05 0 0.62 0 8.21
Oil and gas reserves 21-150 km (ln) 22,150 1.20 0 2.68 0 9.49
Sum of NTL active mines 0-20 km 22,150 19.53 0 58.79 0 694.23
Sum of NTL active mines 21-150 km 22,150 146.39 61.47 242.77 0 2476.13
Small firm 22,150 0.20 0 0.40 0 1
Medium-sized firm 22,150 0.29 0 0.46 0 1
Large firm 22,150 0.48 0 0.50 0 1
Firm age 22,150 15.38 11 15.04 0 203
Foreign firm 22,150 0.15 0 0.35 0 1
State firm 22,150 0.17 0 0.37 0 1
Firm competes internationally 22,150 0.13 0 0.33 0 1
Employment (ln) 20,820 4.89 4.81 1.68 0.69 13.5
Assets (ln) 4,952 12.52 12.53 2.32 2.22 22.68
Sales (ln) 9,741 13.77 13.74 2.23 2.74 25.03
Table A2
Summary statistics
Notes:  This tables provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Table A1 contains all variable definitions.
Mineral produced Percent Cum. Mineral produced Percent Cum.
Missing 5.67 5.67 Nickel 1.05 80.33
Antimony 0.3 5.97 Niobium 0.33 80.66
Bauxite 1.07 7.04 PGMs 0.67 81.33
Boron 0.08 7.11 Palladium 0.45 81.79
Chromite 0.5 7.61 Platinum 0.59 82.38
Coal 35.42 43.03 Potash 0.23 82.61
Cobalt 0.46 43.49 Rhodium 0.22 82.83
Copper 8.69 52.19 Silver 9.26 92.1
Diamonds 0.22 52.4 Tantalum 0.21 92.3
Gold 11.72 64.13 Tin 0.96 93.26
Iron ore 8.37 72.49 Titanium 0.09 93.35
Lead 3.66 76.15 Tungsten 1.02 94.37
Lithium 0.29 76.43 Uranium oxide 0.52 94.9
Manganese ore 1.31 77.74 Vanadium 0.05 94.95
Mercury 0.02 77.76 Zinc 4.86 99.81
Molybdenum 1.52 79.28 Zirconium 0.19 100
Table A3
Frequency table of minerals
Notes: This frequency table summarizes the minerals produced by the mines in our data set. The
unit of observation is a mine-mineral-year (each mine can produce several minerals). Source: SNL
Metal & Mining.
2005 2007 2009 2011 2005 2007 2009 2011 2005 2007 2009 2011 2005 2007 2009 2011 2005 2007 2009 2011
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]
Brazil 1,791        1,614 158 19       
Chile 421 344        280 254 81 63 31 8 1 19       
China 11,900 2,549 9,849 1,793 408 120 2,051 228
Kazakhstan 512 496        n.a. 243 n.a. 178 54 62 n.a. 13       
Mexico 1,145 1,084        833 902 103 139 29 18 135 25       
Mongolia 153        57 65 22 9       
Russia 444 990        n.a. 715 n.a. 197 61 52 n.a. 26       
Ukraine 499 722        n.a. 531 n.a. 155 68 22 n.a. 14       
Notes:  This table shows the number of sample firms by country, the fiscal year that the survey refers to, and sector type. For some countries the 2005 sample cannot be fully split up by sector type. These 
instances are indicated by "n.a.". Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys and BEEPS.
Tradeable sectors
Table A4
All ConstructionNon-tradeable sectors Natural resources
Number of firms by country, survey year and sector type
Panel A s=10 s=20 s=50 s=100 s=150 s=300 s=450 s=20 s=20
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
s=10 s=20 s=50 s=100 s=150 s=300 s=450 s=20 s=20
№ active mines within s  km 0.068 0.162 -0.149*** -0.243*** -0.207** -0.097*** -0.068** 0.331* 0.348**
(0.228) (0.100) (0.023) (0.039) (0.085) (0.031) (0.032) (0.176) (0.135)
№ active mines 21-150 km -0.157* -0.247**
(0.079) (0.113)
№ active mines 151-450 km -0.059*
(0.030)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150 22,150
R-squared 0.266 0.266 0.266 0.269 0.270 0.272 0.275 0.277 0.272
Panel B s=10 s=20 s=50 s=100 s=150 s=300 s=450 s=20 s=20
Interaction with: [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
№ active mines within s  km x Traded 0.580*** 0.389*** -0.054*** -0.231*** -0.215** -0.102*** -0.069** 0.570*** 0.588***
(0.204) (0.112) (0.020) (0.039) (0.081) (0.032) (0.032) (0.194) (0.158)
x Construction -1.841*** -0.536* -0.288*** -0.375*** -0.346*** -0.158*** -0.069 -0.045 -0.322
(0.524) (0.288) (0.072) (0.073) (0.103) (0.049) (0.044) (0.410) (0.378)
x Non-traded -1.510*** -0.656*** -0.271*** -0.259*** -0.171* -0.050** -0.032 -1.170** -1.171**
(0.466) (0.215) (0.059) (0.058) (0.086) (0.025) (0.020) (0.470) (0.527)
x Natural resources -0.935*** -0.456*** -0.438*** -0.438*** -0.346*** -0.139*** -0.099*** -0.139 -0.209***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.042) (0.035) (0.076) (0.029) (0.027) (0.098) (0.034)
№ active mines 21-150 km x Traded -0.190** -0.275**
(0.092) (0.115)
x Construction -0.284** -0.332**
(0.114) (0.132)
x Non-traded -0.088 -0.132
(0.078) (0.093)
x Natural resources -0.184*** -0.360***
(0.068) (0.089)-0.056*






x Natural resources -0.085***
(0.022)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812
R-squared 0.279 0.279 0.279 0.281 0.285 0.286 0.289 0.293 0.288
Table A5
Average business constraints as a function of mines at varying distances from firms
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity, measured at varying distances from firms, on firms' average business constraints. Robust standard errors are
clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed
effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership), controls for inactive mines measured within the same distance from firms as the number of active mines, and a dummy for
whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not shown. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions and data sources while Table
A2 contains summary statistics.
Lag of mine variables: t t-1 t-2 t-3
(baseline)
Interaction with: [1] [2] [3] [4]
x Traded 0.613*** 0.518** 0.587*** 0.618***
(0.060) (0.193) (0.158) (0.157)
x Construction -0.483 -0.556* -0.322 -0.207
(0.370) (0.318) (0.377) (0.286)
x Non-traded -1.656*** -1.190** -1.172** -1.095**
(0.390) (0.475) (0.527) (0.518)
x Natural resources -0.232*** -0.202*** -0.209*** -0.221***
(0.015) (0.040) (0.034) (0.025)
x Traded -0.262*** -0.233** -0.275** -0.247***
(0.036) (0.098) (0.115) (0.083)
x Construction -0.287*** -0.281** -0.332** -0.253***
(0.077) (0.110) (0.132) (0.082)
x Non-traded -0.081 -0.084 -0.132 -0.105
(0.064) (0.074) (0.092) (0.064)
x Natural resources -0.388*** -0.351*** -0.360*** -0.351***
(0.017) (0.086) (0.089) (0.081)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,340 20,812 20,812 20,812
R-squared 0.217 0.286 0.288 0.286
Table A6
Local mining measured at varying time lags
№ active mines 0-20 km
№ active mines 21-150 km
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity, measured at varying time lags, on
firms' business constraints related to inputs (access to land, access to adequately educated workforce, access to finance),
infrastructure (electricity and transport) and institutions (crime, competition from informal sector, ease of obtaining an
operating licence, corruption, political instability, court quality). The sample is smaller in column 1 because the mine status
is not known for 2011. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, *
correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed
effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms,
and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not
shown. Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains summary
statistics.
Ellison-Glaeser 
I: Baseline II III index
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Tradeable 19,470 16,280 16,280 19,603
Construction 673 673 673 673
Non-tradeable 1,879 1,879 592 1,746
Natural resources 2,648 2,648 2,648 2,648
Other 0 3,190 4,477 0
Total number of firms 24,670 24,670 24,670 24,670
Table A7
Sectoral firm distribution by classification method
Notes: This table summarizes various ways to classify firms into tradeable versus non-tradeable
sectors. Columns 1-3 follow Mian and Sufi (2014). Retail, restaurants, hotels and motor vehicle
services are categorized as non-tradeable. Column 2 further restricts tradeables to sectors in which
firms export on average at least 5 per cent of output either directly or through intermediaries
(source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys). Column 3 also excludes the retail sector from non-
tradeables (and labels it Other). Column 4 follows Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and defines (non-
)tradeables according to their geographical concentration. The index is a measure of excess
concentration with respect to a random distribution of sectors across space, where excess
concentration may either reflect natural advantages or agglomeration economies.
Classification method → Mian-Sufi
Ellison-Glaeser 
I: Baseline II III index
Interaction with: [1] [2] [3] [4]
№ active mines 0-20 km x Traded 0.588*** 0.589*** 0.581*** 0.581***
(0.158) (0.159) (0.163) (0.136)
x Construction -0.322 -0.321 -0.375 -0.233
(0.378) (0.382) (0.379) (0.394)
x Non-traded -1.171** -1.170** -0.733 0.278
(0.527) (0.531) (0.569) (0.599)
x Natural resources -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.211*** -0.205***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
x Other 0.589* -0.025
(0.347) (0.413)
№ active mines 21-150 km x Traded -0.275** -0.276** -0.276** -0.292**
(0.115) (0.114) (0.115) (0.108)
x Construction -0.332** -0.330** -0.328** -0.349***
(0.132) (0.133) (0.135) (0.126)
x Non-traded -0.132 -0.130 -0.143* -0.182**
(0.093) (0.092) (0.083) (0.090)
x Natural resources -0.360*** -0.360*** -0.360*** -0.364***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088)
x Other -0.264** -0.228*
(0.125) (0.122)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clusters 44 53 52 42
Observations 20,812 20,812 20,812 20,812




Robustness: Alternative classifications of tradeable versus non-tradeable sectors
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints. Column 1
replicates our baseline results of column 2 in Table 2. The following columns show similar regressions while using different ways
to classify firms into tradeable versus non-tradeable sectors. Columns 1-3 follow Mian and Sufi (2014). Retail, restaurants, hotels
and motor vehicle services are categorized as non-tradeable. Column 2 further restricts tradeables to sectors in which firms export
on average at least 5 per cent of output either directly or through intermediaries (source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys). Column 3
also excludes the retail sector from non-tradeables (and labels it Other). Column 4 follows Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and defines
(non-)tradeables according to their geographical concentration. The index is a measure of excess concentration with respect to a
random distribution of sectors across space, where excess concentration may either reflect natural advantages or agglomeration
economies. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%,
5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed effects, firm controls (size, age,
international exporter, and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, and a dummy for whether a mine of any
status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not shown. Standard Table A1 in the Appendix contains
all variable definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains summary statistics.
Interaction with: [1] [2] [3] [4]
№ active mines 0-20 km 0.355*** 0.007*
(0.120) (0.004)
№ active mines 0-20 km x Traded 0.582*** 0.013**
(0.141) (0.005)
x Construction -0.272 -0.021**
(0.371) (0.009)
x Non-traded -1.109* -0.019
(0.560) (0.014)
x Natural resources -0.174*** -0.007***
(0.038) (0.001)
№ active mines 21-150 km -0.249** -0.009**
(0.103) (0.004)
№ active mines 21-150 km x Traded -0.278** -0.010**
(0.106) (0.004)
x Construction -0.346*** -0.012**
(0.124) (0.005)
x Non-traded -0.143 -0.003
(0.087) (0.003)
x Natural resources -0.365*** -0.017***
(0.085) (0.006)-0.279** -0.010**
0.058** 0.066** 0.053* 0.061**
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030)
-0.148* -0.142* -0.094 -0.084
(0.080) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072)
-0.802** -0.843* -0.797** -0.849*
(0.323) (0.433) (0.317) (0.434)
Country-Year-Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,150 20,812 22,150 20,812
R-squared 0.274 0.289 0.272 0.287
Average luminosity within a 
20 km radius at t-2
№ gas flares within 150 km (= 
0 within 20km)
Local mining and business constraints: Controlling for NTL near firms
Table A9
Average luminosity within a 
20 to 150 km band at t-2
Baseline Mines: NTL
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints. In columns 3-4
mining activity is measured by the sum of NTL emitted within a 1 km radius around mines. Robust standard errors are clustered by
country-year-sector and shown in parentheses. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All
specifications include firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of
firms, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. The number of gas flares controls
for the possibility that night-time light reflects the intense light emitted by burning natural gas that is extracted as a by-product of oil






Assets (ln) Sales (ln) Assets (ln) Sales (ln)
1st stage
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
-0.051*** -0.109*** -0.086*** -0.073** -0.043*















x Natural resources -0.463***
(0.072)
No No No No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm size dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Firm and inactive mine controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 20,820 20,820 4,378 8,023 4,378 8,023
№ clusters 44 44 23 23 23 42
41.50 41.53 41.53 43.97 43.97





Local mining, business constraints and firm growth: Robustness
2nd stage
№ active mines 0-20 km
№ active mines 21-150 km
Notes: This table shows 2SLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firm growth. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered by
country-year-sector. ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All sales and assets specifications include firm controls (size, age,
international exporter, and ownership) and controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, unless otherwise stated. All employment specifications include firm controls
(age and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm.
Constant included but not shown. Standard Table A1 in the Appendix contains all variable definitions and data sources while Table A2 contains summary statistics.
0-20 km 20-150 km 0-20 km 20-150 km
[1] [2] [5] [6]
Brazil 0.35 1.30 0.00 0.05
(1.17) (3.76) (0.23)
Chile 0.06 6.68 0.00 0.00
(0.26) (3.13)
China 0.70 8.67 0.01 0.34
(1.75) (9.07) (0.16) (0.73)
Kazakhstan 0.18 1.29 0.00 0.04
(0.38) (2.52) (0.20)
Mexico 0.00 1.22 0.00 0.00
(0.07) (0.90)
Mongolia 0.05 1.54 0.00 0.00
(0.22) (0.80)
Russia 0.36 5.78 0.03 0.25
(0.52) (18.41) (0.16) (0.72)
Ukraine 1.34 18.48 0 0.72
(3.96) (39.29) (0.04) (1.00)
All countries 0.53 7.1 0.01 0.25
(1.68) (13.17) (0.13) (0.66)
Notes: This table shows for each sample country the mean and (in parentheses)
the standard deviation of the number of active mines and oil & gas fields
surrounding firms. Mines and oil & gas fields are matched to firms based on a
circle with a 20 km radius around each firm (odd columns) or a distance ring of
between 20 and 150 km (even columns). Source: World Bank Enterprise
Surveys, SNL Metals and Mining, and Horn (2003).
Active mines
Table A11
Distribution of the number of active mines and oil 
& gas fields around firms
Oil & gas fields
